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The deficiencies associated with current
risk assessment and negligible risk method-
ologies used to protect public health and
the environment during the current epi-
demic ofenvironmentally induced diseases
serve as the imperative for moving ahead
with a program to phase out hazardous
pesticides and to implement alternatives.
With the release ofthe National Academy
ofSciences June 1993 report, Pesticides in
the Diets ofInfants and Children, the pub-
lic once again is reminded ofthe failure of
the U.S. government to adequately protect
the population from potentially harmful
pesticides. Methods ofgenerating exposure
data and testing for pesticide toxicity are
found to provide inadequate protection for
those who fall outside the averages, includ-
ing children. The analysis supports the
retention and expansion ofthe prevention-
oriented Delaney Clause of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as an
approach that removes pesticides shown to
cause serious adverse effects and promotes
alternatives.
With the release of the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) June 1993
report, Pesticides in the Diets of Infants
and Children, the public once again is
reminded ofthe failure ofthe U.S. govern-
ment to adequately protect the population
from potentially harmful exposure to pesti-
cides. While the report focuses on inade-
quate protection ofchildren from pesticides,
the central conclusion is applicable across
the general population-current methods of
generating exposure data and testing for pes-
ticide toxicity do not adequately protect
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those who fall outside the average. In the
case ofchildren, this means that exposure
data do not take into account their diet,
which is disproportionately composed of
particular commodities (1) and virtually
ignore the limitations ofand the impact of
pesticides on developing organ systems (2).
In addition, while the NAS report focuses
on food exposure, the authors note that
pesticides are not simply a food safety
problem (3). Safety concerns must take
into account the toxicity ofall pesticides in
the aggregate, with an evaluation of all
routes ofexposure.
The NAS report raises serious questions
about the government's ability to develop
meaningful risk assessment models to cal-
culate with any kind of certainty the real
risks that pesticides present. In fact, the
report indicates that the U. S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) has
very limited ability to ensure the public
that there can be adequate public health
protection without major changes in the
way the agency conducts its program. In
testimony outlining an intent to propose
pesticide legislation in the 103rd Congress,
Clinton Administration officials acknowl-
edge the inadequacies ofthe current regu-
latory system and NAS findings of the
need to overhaul the regulatory require-
ments. Administration officials said in con-
gressional testimony, "As acknowledged by
the NAS study, full information on con-
sumption habits for infants and children is
not up-to-date" (4).
Lynn Goldman, Assistant Administrator
for Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic
Substances, said,
The report made a variety ofrecom-
mendations concerning how EPA
evaluates pesticide toxicity, residue
levels, and food consumption, and
how this information is used in risk
assessments. The Academy's recom-
mendations, taken as a whole, pre-
sent a great challenge in terms of
higher standards for the quality,
quantity, sensitivity, and scope of
the data the Agency uses in evaluat-
ing risks from pesticides. This is a
formidable challenge, but one we
are prepared to meet (5).
The NAS report is just one of many
reports that raise serious questions about
our knowledge ofpesticides and their effect
on people (6). From these reports, we
should draw the conclusion that we cur-
rently have insufficient information to
safely calculate the real risks ofpesticides.
This situation exists against a backdrop
ofadverse human health and environmen-
tal effects that in many cases are reaching
crisis proportions.
* The rates of illness and mortality asso-
ciated with cancer are rising. Devra Lee
Davis, formerly with the NAS Board
on Toxicology and now a senior sci-
entific advisor to the Secretary ofHealth
at the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS), said in her
Oct. 21, 1993 congressional testimony,
"We found that industrial countries'
rates ofcancer mortality increased from
1968 to 1986 for a number of sites,
including melanoma, prostate, non-
Hodgkins lymphoma, multiple
myeloma, breast, brain and kidney can-
cer" (7). The NRC found that all forms
of cancer except lung and stomach
cancer are increasing in people over
54-and that this is not attributable to
increased detection capabilities (8).
* Dramatic worldwide declines in male
sperm counts have been found over the
last 50 years (9).
* There are reproductive failures in
wildlife species ranging from alligators
in Florida to polar bears in Alaska (10).
* Elevated rates of childhood brain can-
cer (11) and childhood leukemia (12)
are associated with homes where pesti-
cides are used. National Cancer
Institute epidemiological data from
1991 showed that the rate ofchildhood
malignancies climbed almost 11% from
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1973 to 1988, and did not appear to be
a function ofbetter reporting (13).
Our country needs a national frame-
work for recording and evaluating overall
chemical use. We live in an age where toxic
substances have become a basic ingredient
in our food production system and other
aspects of pest management. Instead of
regulating these materials out of food, we
are debating appropriate ways ofrationaliz-
ing acceptable levels of toxic materials.
This process goes on even when there do
exist alternative, nontoxic, or less toxic
food production systems that compete in
productivity and profitability.
At the community level, where pesti-
cide and pest management decisions are
made-about such things as schools, parks,
and rights-of-way-the question is whether
people want to institutionalize a certain
level oftoxic material or whether they want
to phase out the use oftoxic and hazardous
materials and force a shift to alternative
methods ofcontrol.
Central to the discussion on commu-
nity decisions are questions of risk assess-
ment. Community people are told that the
chemicals in wide use are tested and found
to represent an acceptable or "negligible
risk." Generally, people are told that the
public is exposed to trivial or trace
amounts ofchemicals or, for example, that
their risk from exposure to a carcinogen is
one in a million. What drives these con-
clusions is a process of decision making
commonly referred to as risk assessment.
While risk assessment has attached to it a
scientific mystique, the methodology
brings with it some commonplace assump-
tions about exposure and toxicity that the
NAS report has challenged. In fact, what
emerges from any investigation of risk
assessment is uncertainty. Much has been
written about the uncertainties associated
with risk assessment. The NAS report Risk
Assessment in the Federal Government:
Managing the Process (1983) concluded,
[D]ata may be incomplete, and
there is often great uncertainty in
estimates of the types, probability,
and magnitude of health effects
associated with a chemical agent, of
the economic effects of a proposed
regulatory action, and ofthe extent
of current and possible future
human exposures. These problems
have no immediate solutions, given
the many gaps in our understanding
of the causal mechanisms of car-
cinogenesis and other health effects
and in our ability to ascertain the
nature or extent of the effects asso-
ciated with specific exposures (14).
The president of the American
Chemical Society said, "...risk assessment
requires inferences drawn from limited sci-
entific data" (15). A physician working in
occupational and environmental medicine,
Grace Ziem, writing about multiple
chemical sensitivity (MCS), said,
"Although initially skeptical that such ill-
ness reactions could occur following low-
level chemical exposure, I became aware
that existing chemical exposure limits were
scientifically faulty and that no-effect levels
extrapolated from chronic animal studies
were often orders ofmagnitude below cur-
rent legal exposure limits" (16-19).
Therefore, a number of requirements
are central to risk discussions at the com-
munity level. These requirements, which
should be thought ofas principles for com-
munity decision making, are
* To ensure that all pesticides proposed
for use are fully tested, with specific
focus on vulnerable or sensitive popula-
tion groups;
* To provide full disclosure ofpesticide
test data, all pesticide product ingredi-
ents, pesticide ingredients in all end
products, and possible health and envi-
ronmental effects, as well as to posting
and to inform ofproposed pesticide use;
* To contribute to the prevention of
adverse health and environmental
effects; and,
* To reduce and, where possible, elimi-
nate unnecessary use ofpesticides. While
use reduction decisions must target
high-risk chemicals, an overall strategy
to reduce pesticide use should not be
limited by deficiencies and limitations
in our ability to define risk accurately.
Testing of Pesticidesfor
Health and Environmental
Effects
An April 1993 report issued by the U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) offers a
very distressing update on the status of
U.S. EPA's efforts at reregistration under
the 1988 amendments to the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA). The report issues findings that
indict U.S. EPA's program in two areas: a)
failure to meet statutorily imposed dead-
lines; and, b) a reduction in data require-
ments as part of an effort to speed up the
pesticide reregistration process. (GAO, in
its report, cites U.S. EPA concurrence with
the facts presented.) (20)
To evaluate U.S. EPA's reregistration
efforts, we must review their evaluation in at
least three areas ofdata. GAO has described
these areas as follows: a) toxicity data, gener-
ally from laboratory studies, to identify pos-
sible adverse health effects; b) environmental
fate and ecological effects data, which iden-
tify the fate of a chemical in the environ-
ment after application and its possible
effects on nontarget species; c) exposure
data, which assess the frequency, extent, and
routes of exposure for people, including
subpopulations such as children (21).
GAO found the following:
U.S. EPAisBehindSchedule on
Reregistraions
According to GAO (22),
U.S. EPA continues to fall behind
its schedule to reregister the 18
major lawn care pesticides. In the
meantime, the pesticides continue
to be applied in large amounts with-
out complete knowledge of their
safety. Since March 1991, U.S.
EPA's scheduled study completion
dates for many ofthe 18 major lawn
care pesticides have slipped
significantly, some by as much as 4
years. The following factors con-
tributed to delays, according to
GAO: the need for higher level stud-
ies; repetition of rejected studies;
time extensions; and concern about
pesticide derivatives. Much of the
delay seems to be a function ofthe
registrant failing to adequately per-
form a study and registrant delays
resulting in time extensions. Some
delays are generated by U.S. EPA.
The same can be said for food use pesti-
cides, most ofwhich are also used in lawn
care. According to GAO testimony deliv-
ered to Congress in 1992,
Enactment of FIFRA '88 was
intended to address such concerns
[about the safety of many existing
tolerances] by accelerating the rereg-
istration ofabout 23,000 older pes-
ticide products. However, the
reregistration task has proven more
formidable than anticipated, and the
U.S. EPA will not meet the 1997
reregistration time frame established
by FIFRA '88. In the interim, previ-
ously registered pesticide products
may be used on food under their
existing registration and tolerances,
despite the U.S. EPA's incomplete
knowledge of their human health
and environmental effects (23).
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U.S. EPAHas Changedthe Basis of
MakinZReregistration Decisions from
"Fully' Complete to a"Substantialiy
Complete Database.
Because of this change, it appears U.S.
EPA has been able to accelerate its time
schedule. In the case of 2,4-D, U.S. EPA
eliminated the need for a crop residue
study to makes its reregistration decision,
saving 21 months. With Isofenphos, the
registrant made up 24 months in slippage
when, "EPA determined that it did not
need spray drift studies due in 1995,"
according to GAO. "Two other pesticides,
Pendimethalin and Glyphosate, improved
by 28 and 12 months, respectively, since
June 1992, for similar reasons" (24). U.S.
EPA says it will be using data on similar
pesticides when it drops a data requirement
or proceeds with reregistration even though
the study has not been received. According
to GAO,
One of the 18 pesticides
Glyphosate-is currently in
Reregistration Eligibility Document
(RED) preparation. Although EPA
had earlier rejected a number ofthe
registrant's environmental fate stud-
ies, it determined that the database
for Glyphosate was sufficiently
complete with the studies. EPA
officials told us that they may not
require the registrants to repeat the
rejected studies (25).
U.S. EPA told GAO that it might make
registration decisions without waiting for a
1996 groundwater study on diazinon or a
cancer study on an atrazine metabolite.
U.S. EPADoes NotHaveAdequate
Exposure Data toMakeSafety
Decisions
In its 1992 testimony, GAO indicated that
U.S. EPA did not have reliable data on the
quantity ofpesticides used on food crops.
The statement went even further to say
that inadequate knowledge supports risk
estimates. According to GAO, "[W]e
found that EPA's estimate of potential
human exposure to pesticide residues in
food is uncertain because these [USDA
Nationwide Food Consumption] surveys
are flawed" (26).
Similarly, with nondietary exposure,
U.S. EPA has poor exposure data to use for
purposes of reregistration because the
agency simply assumed that significant
exposure was unlikely. "...EPA is working
on better testing and assessment guidelines
for all types ofresidential exposure to tox-
ics," says GAO (27). It appears unlikely
that U.S. EPA will have guidelines devel-
oped before fiscal year 1997 and then only
iffunding becomes available.
Farmworker protection remains inade-
quate under new worker protection regula-
tions that do not ensure that all workers
have full information, training, and med-
ical monitoring provided all other workers
protected under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act. Our country's "harvest of
shame" must be addressed within the con-
text of reregistration to ensure the well-
being of those who harvest the nation's
food. According to the GAO,
Hired farmworkers are not ade-
quately protected by federal laws,
regulations, and programs; there-
fore, their health and well-being are
at risk. Hired farmworkers go into
fields sprayed with pesticides, but
many have no knowledge of the
specific chemicals they are exposed
to or the potential health effects.
Field sanitation on many small
farms may be inadequate, constitut-
ing a serious health hazard to hired
farmworkers on those farms. Young
children . . . may be more suscepti-
ble than adults to the harmful
effects ofpesticides" (28).
IntegrityofTestDataisStill an Issue
In 1991 the U.S. EPA Inspector General
(IG) reported to the agency inadequate
auditing of testing laboratories used by
chemical companies that generate studies
used for reregistration. In the wake ofmajor
pesticide testing scandals involving falsified
pesticide health and safety data, U.S. EPA's
Office ofthe IG has revealed serious gaps in
the agency's good laboratory practices
(GLP) inspection program. According to
the IG, U.S. EPAmight not recognize a bad
studywhen it came across one because, "the
Agency does not have standards to deter-
mine if a specific GLP deficiency would
compromise the validity of a study."
According to the IG, "ofthe 220,000 stud-
ies completed under FIFRA, only 2268 have
ever been audited-just under one percent"
(KA Kouz, personal communication).
The cost ofdependency on pesticides
must be calculated more broadly. There is
increased general understanding that pesti-
cide use has secondary environmental and
economic impacts, which some researchers
have totaled at $8 billion annually (29).
Defining Acceptable Risk
In the year since the Ninth Circuit Court
decision upholding the Delaney Clause of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(30), the provision has been called out-
dated and anachronistic by politicians and
industry interests. However, the law is
based on the scientific understanding that
we cannot prove the level at which a cancer-
causing substance initiates a cancer effect,
although we can determine that a chemical
is a carcinogen. This distinction stems
from the fact that high dose animal experi-
mentation can tell us that a chemical
causes cancer, but it does not tell us the
low dose point at which the chemical has
no effect. Given that carcinogens have
delayed or long-term effects, animal experi-
ments have never been able to replicate the
time period and low dose. For all the criti-
cism, the high dose method has yielded
impressive results, proving accurate in the
vast majority of cases in which chemicals
are known through epidemiological studies
to cause cancer in humans (31). There is
no scientific basis for suggesting that any
carcinogenic exposure represents a trivial or
negligible risk. The Delaney Clause errs on
the side ofpublic health protection, and
rightlyso.
Those arguing the Delaney Clause's
demise would have it replaced with a negli-
gible risk standard, as proposed by RH
Lehman and TJ Bliley in H.R. 1627 (32).
The negligible risk standard is steeped in
risk assessment methods filled with uncer-
tainties and miscalculations as to sensitive
population groups, such as children and
elderly, average body weight, consumption
patterns, and other exposures affecting the
total toxic load that any one individual
already carries.
RiskAssumptionsBelie Reality
The risk assessment strategies proposed to
replace Delaney ignore multiple chemical
exposures (33). For example, 11 of U.S.
EPA's 32 carcinogenic pesticides are regis-
tered for use on apples and 10 for use on
grapes. Assessing the risk from a piece of
fruit, a plate offood, and three meals a day
is beyond the grasp ofthe proposal. Worse
yet, there is no attempt to aggregate the
risk ofnonfood exposure to the very same
pesticides, which are widely used on lawns
and in parks and school yards, or the risk
to those at highest risk.
Full Disclosure Is Critical
Those who currently use and are exposed
to pesticides are being denied information
regarding the identity and toxicity ofthe
trade secret inert ingredients. The term
inert, by which trade secret pesticide
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formulation ingredients are commonly
known, is an extremely deceptive mis-
nomer since the great majority of these
materials are quite chemically and biologi-
cally active. Furthermore, U.S. EPA has
consistently failed to give adequate atten-
tion to the toxicological review ofthe at
least 1100 trade secret ingredients, openly
admitting that it has so little information
on 71% (800) ofthem that it cannot even
rate theirpotential toxicity.
Among the more notable types ofmate-
rials ofconcern are those that are registered
as active ingredients in other formula-
tions-solvents with considerable biologi-
cal activity and surfactants that facilitate
passage ofother chemicals through biologi-
cal membranes including human skin,
insect integument, and plant cell walls.
In general, trade secret ingredients
comprise from 25 to 99% of a formula-
tion. This implies that very large quantities
ofthese materials are being dispersed into
the environment. Given that many ofthese
secret ingredients are known to have or
may have serious toxicological effects, it
seems clear that the secret ingredients may
be posing as significant a threat to human
health and the environment as are the
active ingredients themselves.
Given that secret ingredients comprise
large portions offormulations, are biologi-
cally active, and maypose serious toxicolog-
ical and environmental concern, U.S. EPA
has aclear responsibility to perform full and
adequate assessments ofrisks posed by these
materials, based upon adequate data that
must be required ofmanufacturers. U.S.
EPA has shown no indication that it plans
to commit any resources to the review of
the over 800 secret ingredients ofunknown
toxicological concern.
Despite large potential exposure and
known and unknown potential for serious
human health and environmental harm,
these materials are allowed trade secret sta-
tus. People have no opportunity to make
informed decisions in purchasing and using
pesticidal products since they do not know
all the ingredients. Furthermore, federal,
state, and local agencies can provide no real
assurance to the public that the pesticides in
use do not pose a serious risk because they
cannot know what materials comprise a
significant portion ofthe formulations.
Preventing the Poisoning in a
lime of National Health Crisis
It must be recognized that the negligible
risk standard-central to H.R. 1627 and
other legislative proposals-is based on
extremely imperfect methods ofpredicting
risk, collectively known as risk assessment.
It is the inadequacies of these predictive
tools that require our critical examination
to determine the validity ofthe concept as
awhole.
An evaluation ofcancer is instructive in
determining the application ofrisk assess-
ment. One operating premise is that dra-
matic steps must be taken to prevent
avoidable exposure to carcinogenic materials
at a time when cancer plagues our nation.
Cancer is a killing and disabling disease of
epidemic proportions and now strikes one
in three persons and kills one in four (34).
Scientific consensus contends that cancer is
mainly caused by exposure to causative
agents in the environment and chemically
induced cancer has been well demonstrated.
We are exposed to a wide range ofcarcino-
gens in our environment, some ofwhich
occur naturally, but many are a direct result
ofan industrialized society.
Attempts at managing risks under a
negligible risk policy ignore the fact that
the last 3 decades have confirmed the sci-
entific basis ofthe Delaney Clause and our
inability to quantitatively define carcino-
genic risk.
TheDelaneyPrinciple IsStillthe Best
ScientificStandardfor CancerControl
Cancer mechanisms are not completely
understood, but all scientifically acceptable
theories preclude measuring or predicting a
safe level of exposure to any carcinogen
below which no individual or population
group will develop cancer. Recognition of
this forms the basis ofthe Delaney Clause
standard of no additional cancer or "no
induction ofcancer."
As a substitute for the Delaney Clause,
H.R. 1627 proposes to establish a negligible
risk standard, tied to an acceptable inci-
dence of cancer. Ratification of this new
standard, already adopted by the U.S. EPA
in an interpretive rule in October 1988 (53
FR 411050) and successfully challenged in
court, undermines long-term public health
andsafety.
Negligible Risk sTooCrulde aMeasure
A negligible risk formulation relies on risk
assessment modeling, a crude tool contain-
ing numerous uncertainties that make it
inadequate for predicting potential hazards
to people ingesting carcinogens. Depend-
ing on the assumptions and models used,
calculated risks can vary by orders ofmag-
nitude. Risk assessment cannot accurately
yield thresholds for cancer effects in
humans. At best, it can give us indications
ofrelative risks.
It has become accepted practice to use
animal cancer bioassays in which animals
are exposed at doses that approximate the
animal's maximum tolerated dose. This is
done to maximize the likelihood ofa posi-
tive effect, using experimental animal
group sizes that are manageable logistically
and economically. Central to predicting
the toxic effects of a substance is the
process of generating a graphical dose-
response curve. The shape ofsuch a curve
may vary from chemical to chemical, and
even for a single chemical it is not likely to
be linear over its entire range. However,
scientists plotting tumor incidence against
dose ofthe putative carcinogen are plotting
data points relevant to the high end ofthe
curve where doses are large. In fact, the
validity ofextrapolation down to low doses
is not easily verifiable and may not accu-
rately predict the shape ofthe curve at that
end ofthe scale.
The One-Hit model used by U.S. EPA,
widely considered our most conservative
model, assumes that tumor yield graphed
against dose will be linear in the low-dose
range (based on mathematical proof).
However, a review indicates that it is less
conservative as popularly assumed (35).
Using data from 1212 bioassays on 308
chemicals tested by the National
Toxicology Program, it was found that in a
small percentage of cases the mathemati-
cally generated curve may deviate
significantly from the actual animal bioas-
say results. This occurs more frequently
than expected by chance, resulting in
significant underestimation ofrisk by what
is characterized as an extremely conservative
technique.
ions Exi Esti
CarcinogenPotency
An essential element in cancer risk calcula-
tion, carcinogenic potency, is derived by
calculating the slope ofthe curve graphed
byplotting tumoryield against dose in ani-
mal bioassays. These slopes, which U.S.
EPA calls Q*-values, may be derived from
a series of carcinogenicity bioassays and
averaged to get an overall potency figure.
The artificiality ofthis process is especially
troublesome when experimental data do
not correspond well to linear dose-response
models, for example, with many Class C
(possible human) carcinogens. Also,
potency is alterable by a host ofexternal
factors. As Maugh (36) stated in a 1987
review,
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Significant differences in the
observed potency ofcarcinogens in
laboratory animals can be obtained,
for example, by exposing the ani-
mals to chemical agents that stimu-
late or depress drug-metabolizing
enzyme systems; by modification of
the animals' diet; by changing the
hormonal balance of the animals;
and by stressing the animals in vari-
ous ways, such as by increasing the
number in a cage.
Most important, the influence ofmulti-
ple chemical exposures is an important
issue that current mathematical models are
too crude to assess, yet it is a reality of
human exposure.
Limitations Exist inEstimating
Exposure
Exposure calculations are combined with
carcinogenic potency values to obtain a
cancer risk estimate. Just as artificial as car-
cinogenic potency estimates, exposure esti-
mates can be derived in several ways,
depending on the quality of the pesticide
residue database. Dietary exposure esti-
mates tend to generalize risk over an aver-
age situation or population, away from the
consideration ofparticular situations and
individual sensitivities. This oversimplifi-
cation is dangerous, since the simple inclu-
sion of exposure figures for sensitive
subpopulations within the overall average
exposure calculation does not in fact
address the particular hazard that a sub-
population might face. Rather, it obliter-
ates it from conscious consideration. As
stated by Hattis (37), "Should the analyst
take pains to uncover and disclose the dis-
tribution of the risk among the popula-
tion? A 10-6 risk of death from a specific
hazard for an aggregated group might
translate into 10- for a particularly at-risk
subset. Holdren cites possible differences in
the distribution of risk between rich and
poor, the medically susceptible and the
population as a whole, and between those
who have a voice in the acceptance ofrisk
and those who do not" (38).
In addition to the problems mentioned
above, risk assessments are limited to the
effects ofexposure to a single toxic agent.
They do not consider "plate-of-food" risks
and thereby underestimate the additive risk
from ingesting multiple carcinogens.
Negligible RiskStandardIs
Unacceptable to thePublic
People have made it clear that they do not
want to eat, or do they want their children
to eat, carcinogenic pesticides. Growers
and consumers agree that the food supply
must be safe. The negligible risk standard
of safety is not an adequate predictor of
safety. The public does not want to be
lulled into a false sense of security. For
these reasons, we support the establishment
of a standard by which society prohibits
the purposeful introduction ofcancer-caus-
ing agents into the food supply and rejects
the unproven assumption that these poi-
sons are necessary to a food production sys-
tem yielding affordable food prices.
Reduce Pesticide Dependency
There are a number of systems in place
pertaining to pest control for farms, struc-
tures, and landscapes. In agriculture, there
are a number of sustainable agricultural
systems that reduce pesticide dependency
(39). Organic agriculture has shown itself
to be profitable and productive. Soybean
growers in Practical Farmers ofIowa have
replaced the cancer-causing herbicide
alachlor with tillage systems and planting
techniques to shade out weeds. They elimi-
nated one ofthe 32 carcinogenic pesticides
announced by U.S. EPAwhile maintaining
productivity and profitability-at yields
higher than the state average and an aver-
age savings ofat least $11 an acre (40). In
schools, parks, along rights-ofway, and in
forestry, alternatives to pesticides have
proved successful. The Government
Services Administration, in its pest control
program for 30 million square feet offed-
eral office building space, has reduced pes-
ticide use by 98% through the use of
integrated pest management (41).
Our pest management systems must be
reoriented toward pest prevention by
designing out vulnerabilities and stress in
the agricultural environment and practices
in the urban environment that invite pest
problems. Until we are able to do this, we
will maintain our current crisis orientation
toward pest management with an exagger-
ated need for pesticide use and pressure to
accept higher and higher risks because of
escalating pest problems (42).
Conclusion
We have an opportunity to change the reg-
ulation ofpesticides and still meet the food
production and nutritional needs of the
public and the productivity and profitabil-
ity needs of those who grow and market
food commodities. The National Coalition
Against the Misuse ofPesticides (NCAMP)
has proposed a federal pest management
act, which takes a holistic look at pest
management and the social and health
costs of pesticide dependency. It is an
approach quite different from FIFRA and
H.R. 1627. It is the purpose ofthe federal
pest management act to provide for the
protection ofpublic health and the envi-
ronment from unwise or inappropriate pest
management practices. It is founded on the
notion that the environment and natural
resources of the country are a heritage
which is held in trust for the benefit ofsuc-
ceeding generations and that the public
health is a paramount concern, not subject
or subordinate to economic considerations.
The approach is founded on the beliefthat
a just and effective regulatory scheme can-
not be devised, established, or administered
without public understanding and involve-
ment.
In keeping with the purpose, the act
has the following goals:
* To adopt and implement a national
and international policy for the promo-
tion of integrated pest management
and sustainable natural resource man-
agement;
To recognize that pesticides are toxic
substances and that they must be regu-
lated as part ofa cradle-to-grave toxi-
cant control policy;
* To govern pest management practices
by a regulatory scheme that embodies
open decision making and public par-
ticipation at every stage and at all levels;
* To govern pest management practices
by a regulatory scheme that is health-
based and designed to protect all sus-
ceptible populations; and
* To ensure that environmental quality
must not be degraded and shall be pro-
tected by the promotion of safe pest
management practices and by elimina-
tion ofdependency on chemical pest
management and agricultural methods.
Legislation now before Congress,
including H.R. 1627, embraces the busi-
ness-as-usual approach to pesticide law and
asks us to take a narrow look at pesticide
use, while lowering standards ofprotection
by calling the risks negligible. Rather than
bring the public into the decision-making
process, H.R. 1627 in particularwould dis-
empower people and state governments by
preempting the authority ofstates to adopt
more protective standards than the federal
government.
Pesticide policy reform must move us
ahead, not backward because of an
unfounded fear that we cannot achieve our
pest management and productivity goals. It
is difficult to find a person who does not
Volume 103, Supplement 6, September 1995 157J. FELDMAN
want to achieve the goal ofpublic health
and environmental protection while meet-
ing needs for food production. The ques-
tion is whether we, as a nation, can afford
to maintain a course of dependency on
highly toxic pesticides with policies that
tinker with flawed risk assessment calcula-
tions. We may feel good about what we
have accomplished in the short run, but we
will have failed our children, future genera-
tions, and the sustainability ofour planet.
The emphasis must now shift to a mas-
sive reorientation away from pesticides,
with regulatory and user incentives for the
adoption ofalternatives, disincentives, and
penalties for those who maintain pesticide
dependency, and research, technical, and
financial support to facilitate the transition
to nonchemical pest management systems.
We can no longer simply talk about substi-
tuting toxic chemicals with chemicals of
lower toxicity. We must talk about replac-
ing toxic materials with pest management
approaches that are not reliant on poisons.
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